Privacy by Design is prescribed by the new European General Data Protection Regulation. Ge ing this privacy preserving design philosophy appropriately adopted is a challenge, however. One natural approach to this challenge would be to leverage design pa erns in the privacy domain. However, privacy pa erns are scattered, unrelated, inconsistent, and immature. is paper presents a pa ern system for user control, which is built upon an existing privacy pa ern catalog. By ensuring implementability and uniformity within descriptions, and establishing relationships using consistent terminology, we alleviate some of the aforementioned issues.
INTRODUCTION
Privacy by Design (PbD) was jointly introduced by the Dutch Data Protection Authority and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada of the time [12] . It is a philosophy that Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. "ingrains privacy principles into every part of every system" [7] . Data Protection by Design (and by extension PbD), is a requirement in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
is legal framework has an international scope which creates a punitive mandate for privacy protection (Art. 3, 83) . It requires services established in the EU, or providing any services to EU residents, to adequately protect privacy (Art. 45). Addressing this need through PbD requires that privacy be considered from the Analysis and Design phases. ese phases are o en approached through design pa erns.
So ware design pa erns were pioneered by Gamma, Helm, Johnson, and Vlisside [22] . ese are common solutions to recurring so ware engineering problems, o en used as blueprints for design, and continually improved over time.
An issue frequently faced is how to present pa erns in a manner which promotes appropriate use. Privacy pa ern collections in particular are lacking in coherence and interconnection. Typically pa erns themselves are improved by being extended or combined with one another. ey may also work together as compound patterns which combine multiple pa ern approaches into one.
According to POSA (Pa ern-Oriented So ware Architecture) [5] , a collection of pa erns should support ease of use, comprehension, and extensibility, using a few natural classi cation properties which provide a roadmap to implementation. e rst step towards this is typically a pa ern catalog, while a pa ern system adds accessibility, consistency, and illustrates pa ern relationships [5] .
is work presents a privacy pa ern system for user control, accomplished by elevating a subset of an existing community catalog [15] to the pa ern system [5] level. We improve the consistency and implementability of these pa erns, as well as the application of the community's classi cation scheme. As the catalog is extensive, we limit the scope of the system to the pa erns within the classi cation focused on user control. e paper provides so ware engineers with the means to facilitate user privacy decisions in a manner consistent with the GDPR. We also provide a basis on which the community can expand to achieve further systemization, or eventually a data protection related pa ern language as de ned by POSA [5] . is is the ultimate goal of the system. e following section describes the various e orts within the community towards privacy pa ern collections, while Section 3 discusses the process and results of our work. During our presentation of the system, we describe how we adhere to each of the POSA requirements [5] . In Section 4 we elaborate on our ndings in applying the schema and the pa ern relationship types (summarized as relationships), as well as how we address concerns within our pa ern system. Finally we provide an overview of our contributions, conclusions, and suggestions for future work.
RELATED WORK
is section discusses di erent initiatives to gather privacy pa erns as a means to help system engineers. We focus on how these e orts fall short of system level as de ned by POSA [5] or do not apply to our study domain. According to POSA, there are six requirements for a pa ern system. A system of pa erns should comprise a sufcient base of pa erns, which in turn should be organized, and should support their own evolution as a system. Additionally, all pa erns in the system should be described uniformly. eir descriptions should include implementation details suitable for successful application, as well as highlight the relationships between them. Doty and Gupta [13] had started to work on an online catalog for privacy pa erns, which initially included nine dra privacy pa erns. It used a variety of categories, including Hoepman's strategies [27] . Li le to no emphasis was placed however on establishing relationships with other pa erns.
Within the PrimeLife project [21] , a pa ern catalog for Human Computer Interaction (HCI) was formed to assist in designing accessible user interfaces. is included een pa erns for privacy policies, which covered a number of aspects. Some of these include icons and the display of privacy information, work ows and interaction paradigms, and holistic approaches to the project itself. ey include a Related Pa erns section, though only as a list of pa ern names.
A separate online catalog was set up as part of the PRIPARE project [8] . It describes 26 privacy pa erns, classifying them with both a ribute tags and categories. To express a few relationship instances they use the following sections: related pa erns, supporting pa erns, and con icting pa erns.
Drozd [16] additionally proposed an online catalog of privacy pa erns which built upon the previous e orts. It presents 38 privacy pa erns in total [17] . For classi cation, a hierarchical schema and application area are used. e hierarchy is based on the ISO/IEC 29100 principles and instructions, while the variety of areas nonexhaustively include: systems' infrastructure, types of applications, and components. Pa ern relationships are not explored.
Lenhard et al. [26] further expand upon the previous collections in their mapping study. Beyond these, however, they note various authors which have reported pa ern languages in speci c domains. Schümmer et al. [33] present such a language with 18 pa erns which aim to help control information ow within collaborative environments. Chung et al. [9] report a pa ern language for developing applications for ubiquitous computing, presenting 15 pa erns organized around 'privacy management'. Ha z [24] , on the other hand, a rms the rst pa ern language for developing Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). is collection composes of 12 pa erns which revolve around anonymity.
As pa ern languages, these each show pa ern relationships. However, they do not use a formal representation.
e ways in which these collections constitute languages are however limited to their speci c domains. It is also not suggested that these languages consider the POSA notion of pa ern language. e de nition given by Lenhard et al. [26] mentions "a set of pa erns and their interrelationships and interactions", while this de nition sits closer to that of a pa ern system [5] . POSA notes that it is not uncommon to mix these notions, reminding that a pa ern language should cover "every aspect of importance in a particular domain".
A number of the aforementioned researchers [8, 15, 17] have begun work as a community. ey maintain an online repository [15] which hosts various privacy pa erns.
is community has taken steps to support so ware engineers, gathering considerable content, and constructing a common schema and classi cation. However, the pa erns within this repository still lack the pa ern relationships and implementability necessary to address more holistic and complex problems. We leverage this community catalog in the construction of our pa ern system, which aims to address these shortcomings for user control.
A SYSTEM OF CONTROL PATTERNS
We have established a system of 20 pa erns, shown in Figure 1 along with their identi ed relationships.
ey are available at privacypa erns.org. Each of these is a part of the classication from Hoepman's strategies [27] , and is further classi ed by a single tactic [10] from that strategy. Distribution of these can also be seen in Table 3 .
e ways in which our system adheres to POSA [5] are each de ned in detail within the following sections. Speci cally, they provide six requirements. Our pa ern system should support its own organization and evolution. It should also describe a su cient base of pa erns featuring uniform descriptions, relationships, and implementability.
Su cient Base of Patterns
At the time of writing there are 32 published privacy pa erns and many more being processed in and outside of the community repository. Together, they total 86 potential pa erns. However, to maintain a manageable research scope, this work de nes a system of privacy pa erns within a subset of those. We have selected patterns classi ed under the strategy [27] , of which there are 20. is quantity is in line with similar domains such as so ware architecture [5] (19 pa erns) and architectural safety [31] (15 patterns). Additionally, three of these pa erns are newly introduced compound pa erns, which use a variety of other pa erns to provide a more comprehensive solution to a wider problem.
Uniform Descriptions
Our system conforms to the schema within privacypa erns.org [15] . We have however added an additional useful eld for implementability, Forces/Concerns, which was not explicit in the schema [15] . According to Harrison [25] , "forces give substance to the problem, and Table 1 shows the various elds collected by the community in addition to Forces/Concerns. Table 1 , elds which were previously optional as per the community schema, namely Implementation and Related Pa erns, are shown in italics. Due to the importance of implementability and pa ern relations in our system, these elds were also made mandatory. We sought to ensure that at least the elds we determined to be Required were uniform in our system's pa erns.
e pa erns in this system are described in Table 2 . Pa ern qualities within are di erentiated by okay, decent (italics), and good (bold). ese are followed by their assigned tactic. Since many of these pa erns were pre-pa erns or otherwise underdeveloped, we endeavored to improve each one so that they may be consistent, comprehensive, and usable. is is further explained in Section 3.5.
Organization
e system of pa erns has been organized according to a classi cation schema based on privacy design strategies and tactics proposed by Hoepman [27] and Colesky et al. [10] . ese groupings match that followed by the community, and allowed us to delineate our scope to the strategy. Table 3 shows the distribution of potential pa erns from the community regarding strategies and tactics. Our pa erns are further classi ed by tactics. ese are loosely distinguished by the means for: ( ) explicit, freely-given, and informed; ( ) optionally selective or exclusive; ( ) timely and completely revoked; and ( ) accurate and up to date processing within personal data.
As per Figure 1 , pa erns sharing the same tactic are shaded according to the legend on the bo om right, while those which are used within a compound pa ern are clustered together within its do ed border. Compound pa erns are also shaded. Classi cations are additionally shown in Table 2 e pa erns are most prominent, as they handle the more general rights a orded to users. e GDPR's focus on also generates some a ention. Conversely, the others, (accuracy) and (storage limitations) within Art. 5 clause (d) and (e) of the GDPR [19] , are less represented, likely due to specicity. Pa erns are positioned to promote relationship visibility.
Relationships
Explicitly documented relationships are an important feature of a system of pa erns. ey can aid both in writing understandable pa erns and in choosing appropriate pa erns for a given problem and context [29] .
We have based our types of relationships on those proposed by Caiza [6] . However, we have only found instances of the following relationships in the pa erns we examined: uses, complements, re nes, similar to and leads to. e following sections explore the distinctions between these relationships. Lawful Consent ( ) A crucial element in privacy protection is ensuring that all sensitive processing is preceded by the acquisition of freely given, informed, speci c, and explicit consent.
Informed Consent for Web-based Transactions ( ) [4, 23, 32] is pa ern describes how controllers can inform users whenever they intend to collect or otherwise use a user's personal data.
Obtaining Explicit Consent ( ) [2, 4, 16, 30] Controllers require consent to be given willingly and speci cally when in any way processing the personal data of their users.
Sign an Agreement to Solve Lack of Trust on the Use of Private Data Context ( ) [2] Services of a controller may require users to sign contracts that stipulate their obligations and processing purposes for which users must consent to use the service. is ensures that users can trust the controller as it is bound to the contract it signs.
Incentivized Participation ( ) Users are more willing to contribute valuable input when they can do so without leaking personal data, or perceive an equal or greater exchange in value either monetarily or socially.
Reciprocity ( ) [33] Let users bene t according to the contributions they make.
Pay Back ( ) [33] Give users some bene ts in exchange for providing information or content.
Support Selective Disclosure ( ) Many services (or products) require the collection of a xed, o en large, amount of personal data before users can use them. Many users, instead, want to freely choose what information they share. is pa ern recommends that services Support Selective Disclosure, tailoring functionality to work with the level of data the user feels comfortable sharing.
Discouraging blanket strategies ( ) [1] Give users the possibility to de ne a privacy level from a range of options each time they share content.
Negotiation of Privacy Policy ( ) [30] Over time, build user preferences from a privacy-preserving default semi-automatically, through opt-in/opt-out, semantics, and informed solicitations.
Reasonable Level of Control ( ) [3, 9, 28, 32] Let users share selectively (push) and make available (pull) speci c information to prede ned groups or individuals.
Buddy List ( ) [33] By default, isolate users to a selection of social connections in a user-de ned circle of trust. Allow them to expand this circle or create new ones based on the existing members.
Enable/Disable Functions ( ) [3] Allow users to decide granularly what functions they consent to before the function is used.
Decoupling [content] and location information visibility ( ) [1] Allow users to retroactively con gure privacy for location information with respect to the content's contextual privacy requirements.
Selective Access Control ( ) [16] Allow users to specify who may access the content they generate, both during and a er submission.
Single Point of Contact ( ) [4, 20] e Single Point of Contact is a security authority who protects the privacy and security of sensitive data stored online by validating the authority of requests and ensuring secure communication channels.
Outsourcing [with consent] (
) [11] e controller has to obtain additional speci c, informed, explicit, and freely given consent before outsourcing data processing to a third party.
Active broadcast of presence ( ) [4, 15] Users may actively choose to automatically provide updates when they want to share presence information, to increase both the relevance of, and control over, their sharing.
Private link ( ) [15] Enable sharing and re-sharing without wide public visibility or cumbersome authenticated access control.
Masquerade ( ) [33] Let users lter out some or all personal information they would otherwise provide to a service. 3.4.1 Uses. e rst relationship to explore is uses (use). As per Figure 1 it comes in two variants. A pa ern may use (use) another if adapting its solution contributes to the resolution of the problem. It must use it (use), however, if doing so is integral to the solution. For example, our compound pa erns may use their constituent pa erns in their implementation, as they collectively make up an overall solution, but are not all needed to achieve it. On the other hand, many of our pa erns (15 of them) must use Lawful Consent, as their solutions are not complete without speci c, informed, and freely given consent. In order to reduce complexity, compound pa erns which must use Lawful Consent are used to indicate that the same is true for their constituents. is does not apply to other relationships, however.
Complements.
A complements (com) relationship establishes that two pa erns, solving their own problems, may work together to comprise an anonymous pa ern to solve a new problem. For example, we have found that Discouraging Blanket Strategies complements the Negotiation of Privacy Policy pa ern. While the la er allows users to opt-in or opt-out of individual preferences when rst using a service, Discouraging Blanket Strategies provides granular privacy levels when sharing personal data. ese pa erns could therefore work together to allow users to revise their initial privacy se ings when sharing.
Refines.
A re nes (ref) relationship indicates that a pattern provides a more speci c solution to a more speci c problem than another more general or abstract pa ern. We found that Negotiation of Privacy Policy re nes the Reasonable Level of Control pa ern. e la er aims to address the provision of su cient control to users by allowing them to provide information in a selective and granular way. e former meanwhile addresses that same problem in a more concrete scenario, at the rst use of a service.
Similar to.
A pa ern which is similar to (sim) another may have a problem and or solution in common. Sign an Agreement to Solve Lack of Trust on the Use of Private Data Context (or rather, Contractual Consent) shares many similarities in its solution with Obtaining Explicit Consent.
e rst aims to instill trust in the user through transparency and contractual obligations. e second aims to ensure that user consent is given truly and willingly. Although at rst they seem complementary, the solution itself is quite the same. Each point out advantages from their own perspectives.
3.4.5 Leads to. e leads to (Lds) relationship describes a situation in which the application of a pa ern generates a problem which may be resolved by another pa ern. Within our single instance, Masquerade leads to Reciprocity. Masquerade allows the user to de ne a desired identi ability level, which could potentially permit misbehavior. Reciprocity could solve this problem by providing di erent levels of access depending on the identi ability provided.
Implementability
We have examined and improved the pa erns within our system over a three-step process where each author alternates an edit and quality check on each pa ern. Pa erns were graded from a selection of ok, decent, or good at the end of each step. Distribution was 9:8:3, respectively.
e ok pa erns meet basic implementability requirements, while decent pa erns have more comprehensive considerations. e good pa erns fully address a contextual problem. We have assigned this grade to the compound pa erns.
In our review, we sought to ensure that each pa ern was made to be in line with the suggestions by Meszaros and Doble [29] , Harrison [25] , as well as Gamma et al. [22] . We examined the available pa ern source material in depth before altering the pa erns to meet this standard. Despite this, we believe the results of this would bene t from a more thorough evaluation.
As per Harrison [25] , we paid special a ention to the notion of Dead Weasels, that is, the pitfalls of overly simplifying or generalizing the implementation details so that there is only the illusion of procedure. Where otherwise verbose, we opted for more concise variations or, where necessary, pointers to detail. In particular, contextually relevant relationships are highlighted within the pa ern descriptions.
Despite our e orts towards implementability, it is also worth noting that pa ern systems do not need to cover all implementation aspects of an information system [5] . However, as a system should be extensible, implementability may improve as it grows towards that of a pa ern language.
is, too, is an aspect worth further validating.
Pa erns may additionally be implemented through the use of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs). PETs arise as concrete implementations toward providing privacy to the user. Within the process of this contribution, we have noted that various authors additionally report continuing work on PETs [16, 23, 24] . On the one hand, Ha z [24] and Graf et al. [23] discuss design pa erns for the implementation of PETs, while, Drozd [16] suggests that PETs could provide a means for design pa ern implementation. We believe that Drozd's perspective is aligned with our approach. Future advancement on the pa erns in our system could result in prospective PETs as concrete implementations.
Evolution
e system of pa erns is additionally available on GitHub [14] and contributes to the community e ort. As such it is open to extension.
is holds true for both the pa erns themselves, as well as the classi cation, relationships, or schema applied to them. rough the interface that GitHub provides, each pa ern's entire content is editable. ey are wri en in the MarkDown format which GitHub supports. Changes are however subject to review by those who the community chooses to provide privileges to. e potential changes are submi ed as Pull Requests.
Outside of the privacy pa ern community, the pa erns in our system are also capable of evolving independently. Work may be adapted in future collaborations and perhaps later joined to the community project. is was already the case with the pa erns delivered by the PRIPARE project on privacypa erns.eu [8] , and will soon include the work by Drozd [17] in privacypa erns.wu.ac.at.
DISCUSSION
is section describes insight obtained over the course of our examination of the pa erns. While we identi ed and scrutinized potential relationships, various aspects worth further investigation arose. We for example did not nd instances of requires, con icts, alternative to, or extends relationships. We nonetheless believe these relationships to have concrete examples outside the scope of our system. e following sections highlight additional considerations, beginning with those concerning the use of the system.
System Usage
As the pa ern system is available online, it meets one of the most important aspects for improving its usability: the ability to browse well-classi ed pa erns in a central repository [5] . POSA adds that this single element is more useful than any so ware tool or method. While these might aid in guiding engineers towards appropriate patterns for speci c contexts, complete automation is not possible [5] . Instead, by ensuring that our pa erns are well sorted, connected, and described, engineers may determine their best application.
Typically pa ern selection begins with context identi cation, from which the need for use of the strategy is determined. Depending on which tactic the engineer focuses on, the relevant pa erns within may be identi ed. e various relationships inside the system aid the engineer in selecting other pa erns to be used for appropriate circumstances. is, as stated by previous authors [29] , will allow for solving complex privacy design problems.
Relational Similarities
In our examination of the relationships apparent in the system, we found that there exists a distinction between some instances of uses. Some were supportive instances in which a pa ern would typically use another, and may nd optional or situational improvements on the nal result. Others, however, would have largely de cient solutions without the use of some pa erns. is behavior, which is also discussed in Section 3.4.1, is distinct from the notion of requires.
e requires relationship instead stipulates that the pa ern in question cannot be utilized without some other pa ern (serving a required function) rst being in place. e pa ern's context would be reliant on the pa ern it requires, but its solution would be reliant on the pa ern it must use.
A common candidate relationship for Lawful Consent was requires. For example, considering whether Incentivized Participation requires Lawful Consent. is was because pa erns like Incentivized Participation not only must use this pa ern, but should ideally do so before being utilized. However, e ective consent mechanisms can also be considered during utilization. If we were to use requires, there are multiple pa erns, components of Lawful Consent in particular, which could be used in sub-optimal or highly speci c circumstances.
We note that this introduces the risk of using inappropriate pa ern combinations. For example, only Obtaining Explicit Consent without ensuring it is informed. To overcome this, each potentially de cient requirement would need additional requirements of its own. Instead, we chose must use as a more simple solution.
We encountered similar uncertainty around whether Reciprocity and Pay Back leads to Lawful Consent.
ese pa erns are susceptible to obtaining illegitimate forms of consent, such as that acquired to protect emotional investment. For instance, where users bene t without contributing to a service, and risk losing their bene ts. Or alternatively, where a desirable feature or reward is blocked with a personal data requirement. Lawful Consent addresses this problem. However, this problem should not exist as a consequence of implementation. It should be prevented beforehand. Leads to is an a er-e ect. erefore, this is also a must use relationship.
Optionality
While analyzing the relationships inside our proposed pa ern system, we have seen that in some cases it has been necessary to determine the level of certainty associated with some relationships. A concrete case, mentioned within the previous section, is the uses relationship.
is kind of optionality mirrors Caiza's [6] automatic navigation (prescriptive pa ern usage). Although these notions seem similar, they refer to di erent perspectives: one to whether pa erns are needed, and another to streamline implementation. Further research is required to make more concrete assertions.
Transitive Relation
We found that some pa ern relationships are transitive. at is, if a pa ern relates to some other pa ern, which relates to another, then the rst pa ern indirectly inherits the relationship between the others. For instance, a pa ern which uses another, which uses a third, indirectly also uses the third.
is holds true for many relationships, but we did not nd this property consistently for the complements, con icts, and leads to relationships. Due to the tight coupling in these, they do not lend themselves to transitivity. Pa erns can also be similar to or alternative to another in di erent ways, such as whether solutions are distinct or exclusive. is could make transitive assertions in these inaccurate.
In addition to traditional transitivity, in some cases, a pa ern may inherit a di erent relationship than it shares directly. A concrete example of this is Incentivized Participation, which may use Reciprocity. Because Masquerade leads to Reciprocity, it also indirectly leads to an implementation of Incentivized Participation. is is the case so long as the actual implementation uses Reciprocity. erefore, Masquerade may lead to Incentivized Participation, as this may solve the generated problem.
Further analysis regarding this topic is required, especially considering other systems, before general assertions can be made, however. Where instances of this behavior are useful, they are indicated in the pa ern text. Note that Figure 1 does not express relationships as a result of transitivity.
CONCLUSIONS
is paper has introduced a preliminary system of pa erns to support so ware engineers in realizing Privacy by Design, speci cally providing to users. is represents a step forward towards an eventual pa ern language for informational self-determination, and then potentially wider privacy issues. e system this paper presents features qualities which address all of the requirements indicated by POSA [5] , which we nd to be most de nitive. ese requirements included support for organization and evolution, and a su cient base of pa erns featuring uniform descriptions, relationships, and implementability.
By extending the e orts of a pa ern community to classify and make available a large repository, a number of requirements were already in place. With the previous e orts of the community, we were able to build upon the pa erns and achieve the requirements set by POSA. e improvements we made aided in ensuring uniformity and implementability in our rewri en pa erns. Most notably, the considerable linking achieved in pa ern relationships was created from the ground up.
ese relationships have been aligned with the pa erns as they are at the time of writing. However, this process can be iterative and thus the relationships may evolve along with the pa erns. We have found that exploring relationships exposes areas for improvement within the pa erns, and thus we expect an iterative process to improve the system overall.
Suggestions for Future Work e next step in this system is to involve the pa erns under the strategy. is will strengthen the system as a informational self-determination tool. Additionally, it may bene t from an iterative uniformity, implementability, and relational examination. Either the original system or an extended variation would bene t from a validation procedure, potentially through a case study with a real-world example. Additionally, an expert review or panel of experts could be used to assess the system. In this scenario, the experts sought out would likely be experienced so ware developers. Finally, relationship connectors could be enhanced to be er complement the notations so ware engineers are familiar with.
